In a recent conversation about the United States, Pavel Shchelin compared the country's internal architecture to Tortuga. The metaphor struck me as unexpectedly accurate. It offers a frame through which one can reconsider the political structure of the U.S. as a self-regulating coalition governed by a code, distributed authority, and a high sensitivity to risk and reward. That analogy seemed worth developing further.
The American political machine is often likened to Rome: an empire, decline, barbarians, and all that. But this is a misreading. The United States is not a project of civilizational transmission. It is a syndicate — a coalition of temporary interests. And if one seeks a historical analogue, it is not an empire but rather Tortuga: a community of private actors bound by a code, discipline, profit-sharing, and a willingness to wait.
A Code Instead of Law
Pirates operated under contract — articles of agreement. These determined who earned what, who made decisions, and who was compensated for injury. This wasn’t mob rule; it was a system. The function of the code was to constrain the captain’s authority and reduce internal conflict.
The U.S. system mirrors this logic. Formally, it is grounded in the Constitution and the separation of powers. Substantively, it is a risk-management device within the elite coalition. No one has absolute power. Everything is shared, everything is checked.
Authority Is Instrumental, Not Sacred
Pirate captains were elected before the raid. They commanded in action, but remained accountable otherwise. If they violated the code, they lost their position.
U.S. presidents are not monarchs. They are front men for political coalitions. As long as they deliver, they are tolerated. When they become a liability, the system initiates replacement under the banner of "renewal." This is not about ideals. It is about performance.
No One Fights Without Incentive
Pirates didn’t attack every ship. They waited. They calculated. They acted only when the expected value was positive. Losses were discouraged.
U.S. foreign policy operates on similar logic. Intervention is not a mission; it is a tool. Decisions are made based on calculation: balance of power, resource exposure, allied reactions. Moral language is often used, but strategy remains pragmatic.
Institutional Form Does Not Imply Ideology
The pirate republic was not a political model; it was an adaptation to a space beyond sovereign order. Stability emerged only through internal regulation.
The U.S. as a global actor follows the same logic. It is not a universalist empire. It is a network — military, financial, legal, technological. Its stability is conditional on structural constraints and internal cohesion.
Reputation as Capital
Pirates relied not just on force, but on predictability. They were feared because their behavior was legible. Fear was part of their soft power.
The U.S. invests in institutional reputation. Human rights, rules-based order, international law — these are all capital, as long as the rules serve. When they stop serving, the rules are revised. Not arbitrarily, but within a logic of systemic risk.
Not an Empire, But a Syndicate
Empires build institutions, civilize, assume responsibility. The U.S. does not. Its system is modular, not vertical. It upholds order where profitable, and tolerates disorder where indifferent. This is not a global state, but a managed network.
Strictly speaking, the United States operates closer to the pirate principle: collective governance, internal risk minimization, and opportunistic external behavior.
Conclusion
Comparing the U.S. to Tortuga is not rhetorical. It is a working model. This is not a state in the classical sense, nor an empire. It is a self-regulating association with an internal code, situational hierarchy, and full rationalization of coercion. As long as the hand is good, the game continues. When it isn’t, the players scatter and reassemble under a new flag.
This frame clarifies much about American democracy and its leadership class. And it stands in sharp contrast to European statecraft, where order rests more on institutional inertia than on the balancing of temporary coalitions.
Arrrr. ■
Sources:
Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 115, No. 6 (2007): https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/521240
Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates, Princeton University Press, 2009: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691137476/the-invisible-hook
David Graeber, Pirate Enlightenment, or the Real Libertalia, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2023: https://us.macmillan.com/books/9780374610197/pirateenlightenmentorthereallibertalia
Gabriel Kuhn, Life Under the Jolly Roger: Reflections on Golden Age Piracy, PM Press, 2010: https://pmpress.org/index.php?l=product_detail&p=314
Colin Woodard, The Republic of Pirates: Being the True and Surprising Story of the Caribbean Pirates and the Man Who Brought Them Down, Harcourt, 2007
Charles Johnson (attributed), A General History of the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pyrates, 1724–1728
Wikipedia — Pirate code